Proceedings magazine is a communication tool for the Coast Guard's Marine Safety & Security Council. Each quarterly magazine focuses on a specific theme of interest to the marine industry.
Issue link: https://uscgproceedings.epubxp.com/i/436751
77 Winter 2014 – 2015 Proceedings www.uscg.mil/proceedings These and similar insider threat situations with maritime connections highlight the need for U.S. Coast Guard leaders to establish, organize, and deploy an effective insider threat detection program. It is important to point out that the term "insider threat" covers a broad range of personality types and motivations. Most importantly, all of these threats have one common dominator: They are individuals who are already "inside" the crew, may be authorized access to the ship or facility, or may be present at associated USCG support facilities. They are already cleared and have access. The question is: "Could they pose a threat to the organization and the crew?" Fortunately, one of the leading service providers regarding insider threat defense, Kaspersky Labs, has developed an essential listing of the kinds of insider threats (see sidebar). 3 The Personality of an Insider Threat USCG leaders and supervisors must identify and recog- nize some of the personality traits of an insider threat and consider establishing some potential behavior monitoring capabilities. Deloitte Consulting recently published a report that outlined ways for leaders to understand the psychology behind seemingly disgruntled or disloyal workers. 4 Insider Threat The Frenemy Insider threats in the maritime environment. by COlOnel sTeve COPPinGeR (usaf, ReT.) Executive Director (Technical), CACI Inc. On March 24, 2014, Jeffrey Tyrone Savage drove onto the Norfolk naval shipyard after presenting his properly obtained Transportation Worker Identification Credential at the main gate. He went directly to a pier in an attempt to board the guided missile destroyer, USS Mahan. When he approached the ship, he was confronted by ship security personnel. A struggle ensued, and after disarming one of the ship's guards, he used the seized weapon to fatally shoot another sailor. Savage was subsequently killed by other armed personnel on the ship. Navy investigators found no connection between Savage and the ship or anyone on it. 1 In a related insider-threat incident, a Navy network systems administrator formerly assigned to the nuclear reactor department of the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman is being prosecuted for leading a computer hacking group called Team Digi7al, which allegedly broke into net- works belonging to more than 30 gov- ernment agencies, private companies, and individuals. The alleged hacker was discharged from the Navy for attack- ing the Navy's system of arranging the logistics of service member relocations, stealing their personal information, and then posting it online. It cost the Navy in excess of $500,000 to mitigate the sys- tem problem and pay for identify theft protection for all of the victims. 2 The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Maui transits alongside the USS Harry S. Truman. U.S. Navy photograph by LCDR Steve Mavica, CVN 75 PAO. continued on page 79