Proceedings magazine is a communication tool for the Coast Guard's Marine Safety & Security Council. Each quarterly magazine focuses on a specific theme of interest to the marine industry.
Issue link: http://uscgproceedings.epubxp.com/i/314313
60 Proceedings Summer 2014 www.uscg.mil/proceedings the fre detection system, and the fre and smoke detectors then returned to a normal status. By 6:03 a.m., the fre damaged the detectors above DG 5 and 6, placing them in a "fault" status. As a result, the fre protection system did not automatically activate. At 6:04 a.m., the captain arrived on the bridge and took com- mand of frefghting efforts. Activating the Fire Protection System At 6:04 a.m., the fire protection system activated in the fuel oil purifer room. 3 Then, two minutes later, the quick response team arrived in the staging area, followed shortly afterward by three fre teams. Three minutes later, the quick response team entered the engine room to assess the situa- tion. From 6:09 to 10:54 a.m., the fre teams rotated in succes- sion to assess the situation and extinguish the fre. At 6:10 a.m., DG 3 and 6 tripped offine and the vessel lost all sources of primary electrical power. Shortly thereafter, the emergency diesel generator (EDG) automatically started with loss of the main power supply; it ran for one minute before it shut down. It took ship's crew 25 minutes to diag- nose and fx the problem: a damaged solenoid valve in the fuel line. Engineers opened the inline bypass valve to restore the EDG's power. A minute later, the fre protection system's pumps experienced a fault condition, and the fre protection system switched over to the back-up nitrogen cylinders to maintain pressure. Emergency Power Loss.. At 6:14 a.m., the cruise director informed the passengers of the situation via the public address system. Then at 6:15 a.m., the local fre protection system automatically activated near DG 5 and 6. This caused the machinery section valves for the aft engine room to open, and the nozzles above DG 5 and 6 supplied water mist. At 6:25 a.m., the cruise director ordered all crew members to their emergency stations and all passengers to the open decks. At 6:31 a.m., the general emergency alarm activated; and, about fve minutes later, the EDG's power restored and the fre protection system's pumps came back online. At 8:06 a.m., Charlie fre team entered the engine room with the chief engineer and the second engineer. About 15 min- utes later, the fre team located the fre above DG 5. The team observed electrical cables burning, but did not see oil or additional combustible materials. Shortly after, the captain ordered the fre teams to use portable dry powder and CO 2 extinguishers on the fre. At 8:51 a.m., the quick response team and chief engineer extinguished the fre above DG 5 with portable dry powder Fire in Aft Engine Room.. Monday, Nov. 8: At 5:51 a.m., approximately 150 nautical miles south of San Diego, the second and third engineers and an engine cadet were on watch in the engine control room (ECR). The second engineer stayed in the engine control room, while the third engineer and engine cadet performed a roaming watch in the engine room. Diesel generators 2, 3, 5, and 6 were online and equally loaded — providing power to the propulsion motors and the ship's service power. The engine room's ventilation dampers and the aft engine room's watertight doors were open in accordance with com- pany policy. Shortly before 6 a.m., diesel generator 5 (DG 5) experienced a torsional vibration alarm, which indicated an unusual vibra- tion in the DG 5 engine. One minute later, DG 5 experienced a fail start alarm, signaling something had gone wrong. The second engineer on watch sent the third engineer and the engine cadet to investigate the alarm activations. As they made their way to the lower engine room, located on deck C, they heard an explosion and then saw black smoke. As the third engineer and cadet retreated to the engine control room, they observed smoke and fames above DG 5 via a closed circuit television system. Soon after, the smoke near DG 5 quickly obscured the cameras. The engineers had no choice but to evacuate the engine control room, because of the increased intensity of the heat and smoke. At 6 a.m., the second engineer shut down DG 5 and 6 and then notifed the chief engineer of the situation. The engineers on duty initiated the vessel's engine room fre emergency procedures, which included shutting down the machinery space's ventilation system, closing engine room dampers, fre screen and watertight doors, and quick- closing fuel valves. At this time, the watch standers in the engine room did not manually activate the ship's installed fre protection system. 2 Next, the automatic fre detection system activated in the aft engine room and numerous visual and audible alarms activated on the bridge's emergency management system panel. The engineers phoned the bridge to notify them of the fre and smoke in the engine room. One minute later, the deck offcer made an announcement to the personnel on the bridge: "There is a fre, is a fre." The deck offcer initiated the crew response and ordered the Alpha fre team to the aft diesel generator. At 6:01 a.m., two fre/smoke detectors above DG 5 and 6 activated. Within seconds, a bridge watch offcer performed a general reset of Summer2014_22.indd 60 5/13/14 9:46 AM