Proceedings Summer 2014
• lack of familiarity with the engine room spaces and
• isolation of the affected space and maintenance of
Moreover, company records indicated that the vessel com-
plied with Safety of Life At Sea requirements for monthly
fre drills; however, the level of documentation for fre drills
differed with each drill, and many drills had very little doc-
umentation beyond the logbook entry.
With that said, marine investigators did fnd evidence in
the logbook that revealed the fre teams conducted several
fre drills that lasted less than 30 minutes, and that these
drills happened on the aft mooring deck or in the mar-
shalling area — not in the actual spaces. It also appeared to
While the fre was eventually self-extinguished, the failure
of the installed CO
system and the poor execution of the
frefghting plan contributed to the ineffectiveness of the
crew's frefghting effort.
Firefghting Strategy, Actions, and Training
Evaluation of the frefghting effort against the procedures
in the Safety Management Systems and Firefghting Stan-
dard Operating Procedure revealed the following areas of
• choice of fre extinguishing equipment (portable dry
chemical fre extinguishers instead of fre hoses),
• decision made to ventilate the aft engine room before
the fre was fully extinguished,
Coast Guard boat crews monitor the cruise ship as it enters San Diego Bay.
Coast Guard photo by Petty Offcer Cory J. Mendenhall.
Coast Guard and Navy personnel unload pallets of food and supplies
aboard the cruise ship. U.S. Coast Guard photo.
A Coast Guard landing safety offcer directs a Navy helicopter during a sup-
ply delivery to the cruise ship. U.S. Coast Guard photo.
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