The Future of Interagency Coordination This incident and the successful use of the MOTR plan and associated pro- tocols sparked efforts to create a per- PDQHQW IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW RIÀFH WR support the MOTR process. The Global MOTR Coordination Center, estab- lished in February 2010, now serves as the MOTR plan's executive secre- tariat for the Department of Homeland Security and the national coordinator for the maritime response to piracy attacks.
The Department of State and Depart- ment of Defense continue to collabo- rate with international partners, and the U.S. Coast Guard and Maritime Administration continue
to work
closely with maritime and shipping industry representatives to share and institute seafarer training and best management practices for the maritime industry to thwart maritime attacks.
Formal interagency coordination mechanisms are being examined by other countries to formalize ad hoc interpersonal maritime coordination. These changes, along with the emer- gence of more interagency operations and fusion centers, will ensure coordi- nating each agency's authorities, capac- ities, and capabilities.
About the author:
Mr. Scott Genovese is the senior coordinator at the Global MOTR Coordination Center. He served 30 years in the U.S. Coast Guard. He was a co-author of the Maritime Operational Response Plan.
Bibliography:
8 6 *RYHUQPHQW $FFRXQWDELOLW\ 2IÀFH *$2 7 "Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa," March 15, 2011. Available at: http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d11449t.pdf.
Mr. Brad Kieserman, Presentation of Maersk Alabama case for the 13th Annual CIAG Conference, "Navigat- ing a Sea of Uncertainty."
CNN, "Hostage captain rescued; Navy snipers kill 3 pirates," April 12, 2009. Available at: http://articles. cnn.com/2009-04-12/world/somalia.pirates_1_navy- snipers-three-pirates-bill-gortney?_s=PM:WORLD.
The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan
The Maritime Operational Threat Response plan (MOTR) is one of several maritime
security plans
drafted to address post-9/11 port and waterway vulnerability.
Representatives from the Depart- ments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Defense drafted the original plan, (then called the Maritime Threat Response Plan). The initial drafts were rooted in standard military or search and rescue response terms. As such, the oceans were divided into vari- ous areas of responsibility, and maritime response agencies were assigned a designated lead based on those areas.
These lead agencies would then have to jockey for the necessary resources under a command and control construct as they took on terrorism or any other maritime threat. Unfortunately, this con- cept only worked well on paper, or when the response agency had the full authority, capacity, and capa-
bility to handle the threat from initial notification to final disposi- tion of people, vessels, or cargo. But, the newest evolving maritime threats faced by the United States, including piracy and terrorism, did not easily fit into this construct.
Discussions and debates continued regarding jurisdictional authority, areas of responsibility, and lead agencies. Eventually, the experts agreed that a unified effort and a whole - of - government approach would be the best solution.
The MOTR plan and process addressed legal
issues, response
capabilities, asset availability, and federal agency authorities in addi- tion to identifying lead and sup- porting agencies. Under the plan, timely information is disseminated, desired outcomes are decided, and agencies move forward to imple- ment the agreed-upon courses of action in accordance with their own procedures.
Not All Responses Achieve the Desired Outcome
In February 2011, Somali pirates hijacked the S/V Quest off the coast of Oman. Four American citi- zens were aboard.
U.S. Navy ships in the vicinity responded to the distress calls, but arrived too late to prevent the tak- ing of American hostages. MOTR coordination was quick and inter- agency coordination of the U.S. government's response was swift.
Unfortunately, the four U.S. citi- zens were killed by their captors despite the best efforts of the U.S. forces involved.1
Endnote: 1. Brock Vergakis, Associated Press, "Two more get life sentences for yacht hijacking," Navy Times, October 4, 2011. Available at: www.nav y times .com/news /2011/10/ ap-piracy-life-sentences-quest-yacht- hijacking-100411/
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Spring 2012 Proceedings
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