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Issue link: https://uscgproceedings.epubxp.com/i/57858
recovered, and two remain missing and are pre- sumed dead. The engineer is believed to have gone down with the vessel. The Investigation ☑ ☑ ☑ ☑ ☑ ☑ ☑ ☑ ☑ ☑. The Flooded Engine Room Testimony indicated there were no problems with PDFKLQHU\ RU ÁRRGLQJ LQ WKH HQJLQH URRP SULRU WR the casualty. While it's possible that one source of the ÁRRGLQJ PD\ KDYH EHHQ IURP WKH GUDLQ SLSH WKDW ZHQW from the lazarette into the engine room, most likely WKH ÁRRGLQJ ZDV GXH WR D IDLOXUH LQ WKH KXOO RU LQ WKH sea water supply system attached to the vessel's sea chest, according to the Marine Board of Investigation. The hull may have been severely stressed due to the amount of cargo aboard, the heading of the vessel as a result of the loss of steering, or the severe weather. Any combination of these could have caused a hull fracture or damaged the sea water cooling system for the generators and main engines. As none of the VXUYLYRUV ZLWQHVVHG WKH VRXUFH RI WKH ÁRRGLQJ LQ WKH engine room, the exact cause remains unknown. Vessel Stability At the time of the casualty, the vessel was carrying twice the amount of cargo that was reviewed in the loading conditions examined in the most recent sta- bility report. The increased weight combined with the extreme weather would have increased the pos- sibility that water could have collected and remained WUDSSHG RQ WKH DIW GHFN OHDGLQJ WR ÁRRGLQJ LQ WKH processing space. There were no operational recommendations made in the stability report that would limit the total amount of frozen cargo that could be carried. This left it to the operator to assume that the cargo hold could be FRPSOHWHO\ ÀOOHG Witness testimony indicated that high water had a ten- dency to accumulate on the aft deck in rough weather. The aft deck was reported to have been underwater DW WKH WLPH RI WKH FDVXDOW\³D FRQGLWLRQ WKDW ZRXOG have reduced the stability of the vessel and increased the possibility that the processing space could have EHFRPH ÁRRGHG &UHZ; WHVWLPRQ\ LQGLFDWHG WKDW WKH ÁRRGLQJ EHJDQ LQ the lazarette and that the engine room had two feet of water above the deck plates. There was a two- to three-foot crack in a horizontal seam weld of the star- board bulkhead in the processing space. The crack had been temporarily repaired with silicone, with 74 Proceedings Spring 2012 no evidence suggesting that a permanent repair had been made. Stability analysis (based on a calm water situation and not including the dynamic effects from the heavy winds and seas reducing the vessel's sur- YLYDELOLW\ LQGLFDWHG WKDW WKH ÁRRGLQJ RI WKH OD]DUHWWH and engine room alone should not have resulted in capsize or sinking. Some crew members witnessed the processing space taking on water prior to the vessel sinking. The analy- sis indicated that the vessel would not have been able WR UHPDLQ DÁRDW LQ WKH HYHQW RI XQUHVWUDLQHG ÁRRGLQJ in the processing space. Examinations of the Vessel Two professional surveys were conducted on the ves- VHO EHWZHHQ DQG $ PDULQH VXUYH\RU H[DP- LQHG WKH YHVVHO ZKLOH LQ GU\GRFN LQ $XJXVW DQG evaluated all equipment and machinery, as well as the internal and external coating systems. The interior plating and framing were sealed and not examined. It was concluded that the vessel was in satisfactory condition and suitable for its intended operations. The same surveyor again examined the vessel in Novem- ber 2007. The scope of the survey was identical to that SHUIRUPHG \HDUV SULRU ZLWK WKH VDPH RXWFRPH³QR recommendations were issued. 2Q 'HFHPEHU D FRPPHUFLDO ÀVKLQJ YHVVHO VDIHW\ H[DPLQDWLRQ ZDV FRQGXFWHG E\ D &RDVW; *XDUG ÀVKLQJ YHVVHO H[DPLQHU )ROORZLQJ WKH H[DPLQD- tion, the vessel was issued a requirement to conduct GULOOV IRU WKH 8 6 &RDVW; *XDUG 0DULQH 6DIHW\ 'HWDFK- PHQW EHIRUH GHSDUWLQJ 'XWFK +DUERU IRU WKH ÀVKLQJ grounds. No associated activity in the Marine Infor- mation for Safety and Law Enforcement database indicates that this requirement was cleared. Life Rafts 7ZR &RDVW; *XDUG DSSURYHG LQÁDWDEOH OLIH UDIWV ZHUH stored on top of the pilothouse: one 15-person craft, PDQXIDFWXUHG LQ $SULO PDQXIDFWXUHG LQ )HEUXDU\ DQG RQH SHUVRQ FUDIW The 10-person life raft was a modular craft, with the FDQRS\ FDQRS\ ÁRRU FDQRS\ VXSSRUW ÁRRU SDGV DQ\ boarding ramps, and at least one ballast bag detach- DEOH IURP WKH KXOO DQG ÁRRU DVVHPEO\ 8SRQ UHFRY- ery, the following pieces of the lift raft were salvaged: KXOO ZLWK ERDUGLQJ UDPS DQG LQÁDWLRQ KRVH DVVHPEO\ ÁRRU SDGV FDQRS\ VXSSRUW DWWDFKHG WR WKH KXOO ZLWK WKH LQÁDWLRQ WXEH DQG SDLQWHU 7KH EDOODVW EDJ FDQ- opy, equipment pack, and compressed gas cylinder were not recovered. www.uscg.mil/proceedings