Proceedings magazine is a communication tool for the Coast Guard's Marine Safety & Security Council. Each quarterly magazine focuses on a specific theme of interest to the marine industry.
Issue link: https://uscgproceedings.epubxp.com/i/284910
61 Spring 2014 Proceedings www.uscg.mil/proceedings Both the pilot of the tank ship and the watch stander attempted to hail the towing vessel, without success. Marine investigators gathered evidenced that proved that the pilot made rudder commands to the helmsman and properly answered various radio calls; and the pilot properly exe- cuted his duties prior to encountering or becoming alarmed by the actions of the towing vessel. Finally, there were no operational defciencies reported about the tank ship on the day of the incident. Marine investigators also found evidence that the towing vessel's steersman had performed the duties of a properly licensed captain before with the towing company's knowl- edge. In fact, the co-owner in charge of vessel operations, who has sole authority to assign the captain to each towing vessel, had authorized the steersman to act as a "captain," holding his own watch. The steersman served as captain aboard several vessels, during an extended period prior to this incident, and received a captain's rate of pay. The steers- man knew his license did not qualify him to operate as a captain without direct supervision, but did so anyway. The towing vessel operated as a "trip boat," meaning it worked a specifc run. The towing vessel operator knew that when a vessel runs more than 12 hours in a day, the crew com- plement must include two licensed captains as per 46 CFR §15.705(d), 46 USC §8104(h), and 46 USC §8904(c). Accord- ing to the marine investigation report, the vessel's logbook showed a pattern of discrepancies relating to this regulation. 4 Lessons Learned Marine investigators concluded that the towing vessel's turn to port prompted the initiating event of this marine casualty, brought on by the steersman's complete loss of situational awareness. Additionally, investigators explored several pos- sible causes that contributed to the incident: 1 Crew fatigue and inattention: Following the unauthor- ized departure of the captain, the crew conducted nearly three days of 24-hour operational duty. Consequently, the loss of situational awareness was so complete that, whether the steersman unintentionally moved the steer- ing sticks or the tow was simply acted upon by river cur- rents, his inattention to his course led to his failure to detect the turn to port. 2 Excessive delay in or total lack of exercising evasive actions: The steersman delayed reversing his engines until 16 seconds prior to the collision. He also failed to answer radio calls or otherwise notify on-coming traffc of his intentions, or of any mechanical issues with the vessel. 3 A loose item of debris may have partially jammed the primary steering linkage on the towing vessel: This fnding led to the conclusion that an open linkage steer- ing system, especially when sharing the void space with unkempt, unsecured items, is susceptible to becoming jammed, lodged, or otherwise blocked. Contributing to that susceptibility is the lack of a protective guardrail around the open mechanical linkage system. 4 Violation of 33 USC Chapter 25 – Ports and Waterways Safety Program: 5 The captain violated this law when he left the vessel to his steersman who was not prop- erly licensed to operate it without supervision; and the steersman violated this law when he created a hazardous condition by agreeing to operate the boat without the proper license. About the author: Ms. Sarah K. Webster is the managing editor of Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. She was previously a news reporter and feature writer for Gannett Inc., and a beat reporter for Micromedia Pub- lications. She is working on her M.A. in communication from Kent State University, has a B.A. in communication from Monmouth University, and an A.A. in humanities of art from Ocean County College. Endnotes: 1. The wheelhouse crew and the deckhands alternated crew-change to avoid a com- plete crew turn-over. 2. A red-fag barge describes one that contains a bulk or hazardous cargo. The term comes from the display of red fags, usually metallic, used to notify others of the hazardous nature of cargo being transferred or carried. 3. Deckhand 3 had replaced deckhand 1 that morning. 4. Title 46 of the CFR clearly defnes work hours for towing vessels: "Towing ves- sels operating more than 12 hours in any 24-hour period require a second offcer holding a license of master or mate of towing vessels. Watches may be divided, regardless of the length of the voyage, but no licensed operator shall work more than 12 hours in a 24-hour period, except in an emergency." (46 CFR §15.705(d) & 46 USC §8104(h) &§8904(c). 5. 33 USC Chapter 25 – Ports and Waterways Safety Program, the results of which, among other things, adversely effected the safety of two vessels and the environ- mental quality of the Lower Mississippi River south of mile marker 99. Thousands of gallons of fuel foats on the surface of the Mississippi River just after the collision. New Orleans water authorities closed several water intake valves to keep the drinking water from becoming polluted. U.S. Coast Guard photograph by Petty Offcer Chris Lippert. Spring2014_FINAL.indd 61 3/21/14 11:14 AM