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21 Winter 2014 – 2015 Proceedings www.uscg.mil/proceedings Change our Paradigm The Coast Guard has historically employed linear case build- ing for intelligence-driven operations — layering elements of intelligence in relatively small pockets to tactically cue mis- sions. In today's world of pervasive cyber threats, this mode of operations is no longer feasible or tenable. Experience has taught us that we must share information over a broad, diverse range of stakeholders in real time and allow many analysts to collaborate and correlate this disparate data for successful mission execution. Similarly, a critical criteria for future Coast Guard capabilities must be system interoper- ability and integration with our DOD partners, particularly the Navy, as well as key DHS components. Systems that interact can extend the footprint of one unit or asset alone, providing an extension of otherwise limited capabilities. The Future is Now While increasingly constrained budgets force the Coast Guard to make tough programmatic and fscal choices, this does not obviate or postpone the need to make appropriate investments in cyberspace capabilities. Many initiatives are cross-governmental or come with resource contributions to gain equities (cloud-based, IC ITE, and object-based produc- tion, for example). We must take advantage of every possible opportunity to learn from others and leverage initiatives to make the most of the resources we do have. Moving Ahead It is clear that cyberspace is a critical operational domain to the Coast Guard. Like many U.S. government organizations have done, we too must take the appropriate actions in the domain to facilitate Coast Guard missions that are critical to the nation. To accomplish this, we can learn from our Department of Defense and other partners to frame questions and drive the actions we can take today to ensure successful mission execution in the cyberspace operational domain. About the authors: CAPT Jeff Radgowski is the commander, U.S. Coast Guard Cryptologic Group. He has served in the Coast Guard for 24 years since graduating from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. He is a professionally licensed mechani cal engineer and holds an M.S. in ocean engineering, an MBA, an M.A. in international relations and homeland security, and an M.S. in strategic intelligence. CAPT Katherine Tiongson is the chief of Intelligence Plans and Policy at Coast Guard headquarters. She has served for 25 years since graduating from the Coast Guard Academy in 1989 as a government major and holds an M.S. in strategic intelligence. Endnotes: 1. CJCS Joint Pub 3-12. See Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: The Defnition of Cyberspace, May 12, 2008. 2. Air Force Cyber Command Strategic Vision, Feb. 2008. 3. ht t p://ccdcoe.org/publicat ions/virt ualbat tlef ield/12 _NAZARIO%20Polit i- cally%20Motivated%20DDoS.pdf. 4. Intentional high-power jamming incidents in South Korea in 2010, 2011, 2012 cumulatively affected more than 300 cell towers, 1,000 planes, and 250 ships. 5. GAO Report on Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity, June 2014. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate. GAO-14-459. "Those hostile to the United States inces- santly exploit our networks, necessitating our constant vigilance and aggressive, intelligent action… ." — U.S. Navy Admiral Michael Rogers NSA director The signal-to-noise ratio (the ratio of useful information to false or irrelevant data) is smaller than ever, and trying to fgure out which of those signals is valuable gives a new meaning to "hiding in plain sight." Additionally, the cyber fash-to-bang time is far quicker than the kinetic version. When the Coast Guard cannot utilize its intelligence to conduct timely cyberspace operations, it risks more than just its networks — it jeopardizes its ability to exe- cute missions. Therefore, our cyber-based intelligence must constantly monitor, identify, and neutralize these threats. Be Agile The Coast Guard must identify its most relevant threats and cue our operational response to address them. To accom- plish this, we must deconfict the growing number of mili- tary and civilian EM/cyber systems. Additionally, we must continuously update our systems to ensure they are meeting our cyber needs. This effort requires a commitment to con- tinued and increased cooperation and collaboration across the cyberspace community. Agility with respect to person- nel requires a similar construct to build our cryptologic expertise in the Coast Guard — leverage training wherever possible and strategically place personnel within key nodes throughout DOD and the intelligence community to pro- vide the maritime perspective other agencies may not have an understanding or appreciation for, while also building our knowledge and skills that will reap great beneft for the Coast Guard. We have started that effort integrating Coast Guard personnel within USCYBER Command and in key cyber-focused offces within the National Security Agency; however, we must remain vigilant to opportunities within the combatant commands, Navy elements, DHS, and else- where that may provide similar return on investment for the Coast Guard. This effort also requires alignment of cyber- space workforce policy, recruiting, training, and retention efforts with DOD, as feasibly possible.