Proceedings magazine is a communication tool for the Coast Guard's Marine Safety & Security Council. Each quarterly magazine focuses on a specific theme of interest to the marine industry.
Issue link: https://uscgproceedings.epubxp.com/i/436751
84 Proceedings Winter 2014 – 2015 www.uscg.mil/proceedings 2012, once the conditions began to worsen, increasing seas accelerated the rate the vessel was taking on water. And the increasing winds blew out multiple sails and caused the spanker gaff to break. Moreover, the increasing sea state caused many crew mem- bers to become seasick, and the conditions also made it dif- fcult to get adequate sleep, not only because of the rough seas, but because the crew sleeping quarters became satu- rated with water that leaked through the deck. As the voy- age progressed and conditions worsened, moving about the vessel became increasingly diffcult and resulted in three crew injuries. Environmental conditions affected the crew's ability to com- municate with one another on deck, as well as communi- cate with the U.S. Coast Guard, or any other nearby vessels. Environmental conditions also made preparations to aban- don ship extremely diffcult, for example, donning survival suits, lifejackets, and climbing harnesses. Once the crew had abandoned ship, the heavy weather con- ditions made it exceedingly diffcult to get into the infatable life rafts. Crew members testifed that entering the life raft took at least one hour once they reached the raft. Wind and seas caused one of the life rafts to fip during the rescue. The organization failed to provide effective oversight and operating restrictions for its vessel and personnel. The orga- nization's manager and director, who are both responsible for making critical decisions regarding the maintenance and operation of vessel, were ill equipped to make such decisions due to their lack of experience with vessel opera- tions, especially when considering the uniqueness of an aged, wooden vessel. Also, they each had full knowledge that the master intended to take the vessel into close prox- imity to Hurricane Sandy, and they took no action to stop this or question the master's decision making. The master had the respect of his crew, industry peers, shipyard personnel, and company management. From all reports he had tremendous skill, and he knew the vessel better than anyone. He knew of the vessel's defects, the mag- nitude of the storm, and the experience level of his short- handed crew. Therefore, the master should have recognized the very real dangers his decisions imposed on the ship and crew. According to testimony, the chief mate compelled the master to hold a meeting with his crew to address their concerns and convince them that he and the vessel were capable of the trip and that leaving was a way to protect the vessel. However, the master's actions conficted with all known maritime methodologies for storm avoidance. Moreover, practically every mariner in the Atlantic chose to either tie up their vessel, or diverted from Hurricane Sandy. One Recovered from the Sea The airborne search continued through the morning into Monday afternoon, Oct. 29, 2012. At 4:30 p.m., the Coast Guard found the missing deckhand, unresponsive. The deckhand did not survive. Moreover, the search for the miss- ing master continued and ultimately encompassed approxi- mately 10,000 square miles of search patterns (22 patterns), using surface and air assets. The Coast Guard Fifth District commander suspended the search at approximately 8 p.m., Thursday, Nov. 1, 2012. The master remains missing and is presumed dead. The vessel sank approximately 123 miles southeast of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, in approxi- mately 14,000 feet of water. Lessons Learned The weather was clearly a factor from the beginning of the voyage. Although the conditions related to Hurricane Sandy did not directly affect the vessel until Saturday, Oct. 27, The History Behind the Ship The vessel, constructed for the 1962 flm "Mutiny on the Bounty," was actually a replica of the 1787 Royal Navy sailing ship HMS BOUNTY. Although designed for a flm, the vessel could perform ocean voyages, much like its predecessor. After flming the movie, the vessel sailed on a worldwide promotional tour and became a tourist attraction in several locations, but primarily Fall River, Massachusetts, and St. Petersburg, Florida. It also appeared in several other motion pictures. Under its most current ownership, the vessel operated as a temporarily moored attraction vessel. In this capacity, the vessel moored at a pier or fxed structure, and passengers would embark for tours, after paying a fee. For approximately twenty years prior to the casualty, the Coast Guard primarily inspected the vessel as a moored attraction vessel. Outside of its regulatory oversight of the vessel's service as a moored attraction vessel, the Coast Guard treated the vessel as a recreational vessel. A review of the documentary and testimonial evidence indicated that the Coast Guard presumed that when the vessel traveled from port to port, it did so as a recreational vessel. As such, the vessel would have been subject to requirements of 33 CFR Parts 175 and 183. The operating assumption regarding the vessel's status as a recreational vessel is refected, among other items, in evidence uncovered by this investigation. The vessel was not certifcated, or permitted, to carry passen- gers for hire, while underway as a passenger vessel, as defned in 46 U.S.C. § 2101 (22). However, a witness testifed that the vessel did carry passengers on occasions, when issued a special permit.