Proceedings magazine is a communication tool for the Coast Guard's Marine Safety & Security Council. Each quarterly magazine focuses on a specific theme of interest to the marine industry.
Issue link: https://uscgproceedings.epubxp.com/i/436751
85 Winter 2014 – 2015 Proceedings www.uscg.mil/proceedings Every tall ship captain interviewed for this investigation indicated disbelief over the actions of the vessel's master and stated they would have never left port, or that they would have sought a safe berth in suffcient time. The master chose to steer toward Hur- ricane Sandy at a near constant bearing and decreasing range with no compelling rea- son to do so. The vessel's only written safety doctrine was the "HMS Bounty Crew Manual." There was no direction or input by the ves- sel's organization, which meant that the creation, implementation, and execution of risk management efforts were left solely to the master and his crew. With no over- sight from the owner or independent out- side source, the master instituted a safety culture on the vessel with insuffcient stan- dards—especially in the area of voyage planning and emergency operations. The age of the vessel and the poor condition of its main structure all likely contributed to the vessel taking on water in multiple locations, leading to the progressive fooding. Under normal operating conditions, both underway and at the pier, the vessel relied on its bilge pumps to maintain buoyancy due to the continuous ingress of water through the hull planking. In heavy seas, the frequency and duration of bilge pump "run time" increased, because of the almost exponential increase in water ingress as a result of the hull working during heavy seas. All crew testifed to this fact and to the fact that the vessel had a history of near misses related to fooding. The vessel taking on water was apparently an occurrence that was accepted as the norm for wooden ves- sels. While it is not unusual for wooden hull vessels to make more water in a seaway, a vessel relying primarily on bilge pumps to stay afoat is a sign of more serious defects within the hull structure. Acknowledgments: Proceedings would like to thank CDR Kevin Carroll, chief, Prevention Department at Coast Guard Sector Hampton Roads; Mr. Ken Olsen, of the Offce of Investigations and Analysis at USCG headquarters; and Mr. Lou Novak, Offce of Auxiliary and Boating Safety, Recre- ational Boating Product Assurance Branch at USCG headquarters, for contributing to this story. About the author: Ms. Sarah K. Webster is the managing editor of the Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. She was previously a news reporter and feature writer for Gannett Inc., and a beat reporter for Micromedia Publications. She has an M.A. in communication from Kent State University, a B.A. in communication from Monmouth University, and an A.A. in humanities of art from Ocean County College. Endnotes: 1. Around the same time as the meeting, the National Hurricane Center released another "Hurricane Sandy Advisory," this time listing the storm's current latitude and longitude—placing the storm's center at about 125 miles east southeast of Nassau, Bahamas. The advisory reported "Sandy," as a category two hurricane on the Saffr-Simpson hurricane wind scale. The report indicated that the storm's hurricane winds extended outward to 35 miles and its tropical storm force winds extended outward up to 205 miles. The forecast also addressed the storm's size and indicated the hurricane may grow larger in the following days. The master and the offcers had full knowledge of the hurricane's forecasts through Weather Fax, the National Hurricane Center, and television broadcasts. 2. All crew members interviewed stated that the master's tenure on the ship and his claimed prior history with storms gave them confdence. 3. All course information for the vessel analyzed for this investigation was obtained from its Automatic Identifcation System, with data received by the USCG Naviga- tion Center, Alexandria, Va., and emails from the master. 4. According to witness testimony, it was typical for the vessel to make water in a heavy seaway. 5. The sail on a lower mast is called the course; thus the sail of the lower mast of the fore mast (the fore lower mast) is called the fore course, and the course of the main mast is called the main course. See http://sailing-ships.oktett.net/square-rigging.html. 6. A vessel is said to be on her "beam ends" when she is heeled over so far that the deck beams are vertical. The tall ship Bounty is shown submerged in the Atlantic Ocean during Hurricane Sandy, approxi- mately 90 miles southeast of Hatteras, North Carolina, Monday, Oct. 29, 2012. U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Offcer Tim Kuklewski.