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Lessons Learned
Investigations USCG Casualty
Lethal Lifesaver Carbon dioxide saves
a ship but claims two lives.
by MS. CAROLYN STEELE Technical Writer
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broke out in the engine room of the M/V Cape Horn, which was approximately 645 nautical miles north- HDVW RI +RQROXOX +DZDLL 7KRXJK WKH À UH FDXVHG extensive material damage, it was contained before it VSUHDG WR RWKHU SDUWV RI WKH YHVVHO 7KH À UH GHVWUR\HG expensive equipment, but ensuing events caused damage that cannot be assigned a price tag—the loss of human life.
Background The vessel is a roll-on/roll-off (RoRo) ship, designed to carry vehicles and equipment to support humani- tarian and combat missions. These ships have a cargo carrying capacity of more than 380,000 square feet— HTXLYDOHQW WR DOPRVW HLJKW IRRWEDOO À HOGV
Two weeks before the accident, the vessel had been activated from reduced operational status in San )UDQFLVFR WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ D PLOLWDU\ H[HUFLVH 2Q 0DUFK
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Sequence of Events The Fire—During the midwatch, the third assistant engineer noticed a small leak in the No. 9 cylinder IXHO RLO UHWXUQ OLQH +H ZRXOG ODWHU VWDWH KH QRWLÀ HG the chief engineer of the leak, and this information was passed to the second engineer during the watch UHOLHI +RZHYHU QR DWWHPSW ZDV PDGH WR À [ WKH SURE lem at that time.
At 5:53 a.m., the ship's engineering automated read- out log showed a sudden series of alarms. The second DVVLVWDQW HQJLQHHU RQ ZDWFK VDZ VPRNH À OOLQJ WKH HQJLQH URRP +H FDOOHG WKH EULGJH DQG OHIW WKH DUHD with another crewmember without pushing the emer- gency engine cut-off switch. The chief mate sounded the general alarm and awakened all crewmembers, including the captain, who assumed control of the bridge.
At 5:56 a.m., the engineering automated log showed that the main engine remote control shutdown had been activated.
Failed Attempts to Close the Machine Shop Door— At 5:58 a.m., the second engineer started the emer- gency diesel generator, as instructed by the chief engineer. In preparation for releasing carbon dioxide (CO2
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neer, and assistant engineer went to the machine shop to close the sliding watertight door and contain the À UH +RZHYHU WKH\ ZHUH XQDEOH WR GR VR EHFDXVH WKH door had been jury-rigged with a T-handle to jam it RSHQ :LWK WKLFN ELOORZLQJ VPRNH À OOLQJ WKH VSDFH they retreated.
M/V Cape Horn 78 Proceedings Winter 2011-2012 www.uscg.mil/proceedings
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